セミナー・ワークショップ

【開催予定のセミナー】

International Workshop on Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance

[日時] 2022年10月8日 9:30-17:00

[場所] 大阪大学社会経済研究所

[登録および詳細](大阪大学社会経済研究所Webページ)

下記URL内の登録ページより10月4日までにご登録ください。

https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/collabo/event_20221008.html

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Special Lecture on Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance by John Duffy

日時 2022年9月30日、10月7日 16:30-18:00

場所 オンライン(zoom) 

講師 John Duffy(University of California Irvine)

テーマ Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance

登録および詳細(大阪大学社会経済研究所Webページ)https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/collabo/event_20220930.html


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【開催終了したセミナー】

Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics

[日程] 9月11日(日)、12日(月) 10:00-17:00

[場所]  慶応義塾大学三田キャンパス(東京都港区三田2-15-45)およびオンライン 

[プログラム] 

The Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics 2022 program

CEFMセミナー

日程[Date]     8月5日 (金) [5 (Fri.) Aug.] 16:30-18:00

場所[Place]   早稲田大学3号館9階909教室 [Waseda Iniversity Building 3 9th floor Room909]

報告者[Speaker]    Di Feng (University of Lausanne)

題目[Title]     "Top trading cycles based mechanisms for multiple-type housing markets"

言語[Language]     英語 [English]

概要[Abstract]   1) Characterizing the Coordinatewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets, with Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn

 

We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model of trading indivisible objects (houses) (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the coordinatewise top-trading-cycles (cTTC) mechanism.

We first show that on the subdomain of lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy-proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the cTTC mechanism (Theorem 1). Second, using Theorem 1, we obtain a corresponding characterization on the domain of separable preferences (Theorem 2). We obtain corresponding results when replacing [strategy-proofness and non-bossiness] with effective group (or pairwise) strategy-proofness (Corollaries 1 and 2). Finally, we show that on the domain of strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness (Theorem 3). Our characterizations of the cTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets.

 

2) Endowments-swapping-proofness in Multiple-Type Housing Markets

 

For Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), Fujinaka and Wakayama (2018) propose a new incentive property, endowments-swapping-proofness, that excludes manipulations that a pair of agents can conduct before the operation of the selected mechanism by swapping their endowments. We investigate endowments-swapping-proofness for Moulin (1995)’s multiple-type housing markets, which are an extension of Shapley-Scarf housing markets with multi-unit demand. Different to Shapley-Scarf housing markets, for multiple-type housing markets, there are various ways to swap endowments. Motivated by this observation, we introduce three extensions of endowments-swapping-proofness: bundle endowments-swapping-proofness, one type endowments-swapping-proofness, and flexible endowments-swapping-proofness.

Based on the first two weaker endowments-swapping-proofness properties that we proposed, and other well-studied properties (individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness), on several preferences domains we provide characterizations of two extensions of the top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism: the Bundle top-trading-cycles (bTTC) mechanism and the coordinate-wise top-trading-cycles (cTTC) mechanism. Moreover, we also show that the strongest possible endowments-swapping-proofness property (flexible endowments-swapping-proofness) leads to an impossibility.

Our characterization of the bTTC mechanism constitutes the first characterization of an extension of the prominent TTC mechanism to multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences.

本セミナーはどなたでも来聴自由です。
事前予約は不要です。日程などをご確認の上、直接会場にお越しください。

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CEFMセミナー

日程[Date]     7月22日 (金) [22 (Fri.) July] 10:40-12:10

場所[Place]     早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス3号館702教室 [Waseda University, 3-702]

報告者[Speaker]     Noemí Navarro(University of Rennes 1 )

題目[Title]     "Linguistic Convention and Language Segregation for the Basque Language"

言語[Language]     英語 (English)

概要[Abstract]     This paper examines the links between proficiency, motivation, and use for the Basque minority language. We apply the model proposed
by Laruelle et al. (2019) and use data from the Sixth Sociolinguistic Survey on Basque (2019). We find that language segregation, i.e. the
fact that speakers meet with other speakers depending on their degree of motivation to use the minority language, plays a crucial role
in shaping the link between proficiency, motivation, and use.

本セミナーはどなたでも来聴自由です。
事前予約は不要です。日程などをご確認の上、直接会場にお越しください。

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CEFMセミナー

日時[Date]:2022年7月15日(金) 16:30-18:30

開催場所[Place]:早稲田大学 早稲田キャンパス 3号館704教室

使用言語[Language]:英語

申込方法[Application]:事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。

【第一部】[Session1]
報告者[Speaker]:Wael Bousselmi(Ecole polytechnique)

講演タイトル[Title]: "How do markets react to (un)expected fundamental value shocks? An experimental analysis"

概要[Abstract]:We study experimentally the reaction of asset markets to fundamental value (FV) shocks. The pre-shock and post-shock FV are both constant, but after the shock the FV is either higher or lower than before. We compare treatments with expected shocks (the date and the magnitude are known in advance, but not the direction) to treatments with unexpected shocks (subjects only know that a shock may occur but are unaware of the date and the magnitude). We observe mispricing in markets without shocks and in markets with shocks. Shocks tend to reduce the post-shock price deviation and to increase the difference of opinions (DO), whatever the type of the shock (expected or unexpected) and its direction (upwards or downwards). In contrast to standard predictions, the larger DO after a shock is not accompanied by an increase in transaction volumes, but by sharp depression of share turnover.


【第二部】[Session2]
報告者[Speaker]:Ali Ozkes(EMLV business school)

講演タイトル[Title]:"Polarization in Networks: Identification-alienation Framework" (joint work with Kenan Huremovic (IMT Lucca, Italy))

概要[Abstract]:We introduce a model of polarization in networks as a unifying setting for the measurement of polarization that covers a wide range of applications. We consider a substantially general setup for this purpose: node- and edge-weighted, undirected, and connected networks. We generalize the axiomatic characterization of Esteban and Ray (1994) and show that only a particular instance within this class can be used justifiably to measure polarization in networks.

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CEFMワークショップ


日程[Date] :2022年7月8日(金) 16:30-18:00 

開催場所[Place]:早稲田大学 早稲田キャンパス 3号館704号室

報告者[Speaker]:Matias Nunez(Ecole polytechnique)

講演タイトル[Title]: "Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation"

使用言語[Language]:英語

概要[Abstract] :Eliminating –or trimming– extreme reports before aggregating them is usually motivated by the perception that it constitutes a remedy for strategic misreporting. This work focuses on the strategic calculus of voting when using trimmed-mean mechanisms for preference aggregation. Contrary to the above presumption, we show, both formally and experimentally that, under such mechanisms, voters persistently resort to strategic polarization for all but the most extreme levels of trimming. Furthermore, we show that while trimming promotes efficiency (i.e. the average payoff increases), it also leads to more inequality (i.e. the minimum payoff decreases). While experimental results provide some support for the idea that trimming can mitigate strategic misreporting, the extent of this non-equilibrium behavior is not enough to overturn the comparative static predictions in this setting.

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CEFMセミナー

日程[Date]     7月1日 (金) [1 (Fri.) July] 16:30-18:00
場所[Place]     早稲田大学3号館704教室 [Waseda University, 3-704]
報告者[Speaker]     Alina Velias(the London School of Economics)
題目[Title]     The ignorance trap: who falls prey to expert-defying populism and why  
言語[Language]     英語 [English]
概要[Abstract]  How do people choose expert advice? What personal traits determine the persuasiveness of expert versus populist advice? Populists, in our context, conform to commonly held beliefs, even when wrong. Do participants choose the high-accuracy adviser (‘the Expert’), or the low accuracy one (‘the Charlatan’), whose answers are designed to be similar to the modal participant’s? In this paper, building on previous work by Alysandratos, Boukouras, Georganas & Maniadis (2021), we develop and test on a representative sample of 12000 subjects, a simple task that captures the essence of the expertise detection problem, yet has a very tractable theoretical solution: if you (believe you) are knowledgeable in a topic, choose experts you agree with. If you are not knowledgeable, you are better served by experts that tell you what you did not think of yourself.  

We find that high human capital subjects find it easier to apply the counterintuitive strategy than others. Simply put, to be able to persuade the median citizen and those lying lower in the cognitive distribution, experts face a double challenge: they have to lower the citizens’ disbelief regarding the expert’s advice and convince them that any lingering disbelief might be a good sign. Our findings provide a novel explanation why low-skilled citizens are susceptible to populism. It is not about preferences, incentives, or simple motivated reasoning. Some citizens simply cannot distinguish populist charlatans from true experts. While we have identified a mechanism that allows charlatans to win, and the target audience for this sort of populism, finding comprehensive solutions to overcome it is left for further research. 
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参加研究者セミナー


日程[Date]     6月24日 (金) [24 (Fri.) June.] 16:30-18:00
場所[Place]     早稲田大学3号館704教室 (Waseda University, 3-704)
報告者[Speaker]     Charles Noussair(The University of Arizona)
        アメリカ側コーディネーター
題目[Title]     Don’t tell anyone I lost to a girl! Gender stereotypes and hiding low performance
言語[Language]     英語 (English)
概要[Abstract]    Social scientists from several disciplines have asserted that men incur a psychological cost when they are outperformed by a female competitor. We conduct a laboratory experiment that allows us to measure this cost for performance in a mathematical task. The experiment is conducted in both the US and China.We find that in our Chinese sample, men are willing to pay more to hide the fact that they have performed worse than another individual than women are, while there is no gender difference in the US. In China, women are willing to pay more to hide poor performance when losing to another woman than to a man. In the US, the opposite pattern is observed; women have a greater cost of revealing that they have lost to a man than to another woman. The gender of the counterpart is not a determinant of men’s willingness to hide poor performance. An incentivized questionnaire reveals that a stereotype that men would outperform women exists in the Chinese sample, but not among our American participants.

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参加研究者セミナー

日時: 6月3日(金) 16:30-18:00
場所: 3号館704教室
報告者: Yukio Koriyama(ecole polytechnique)
言語: 日本語
申込方法:事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください

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CEFMオンラインワークショップ

[日程] 2022年2月28日(月)オンラインby ZOOM
[プログラム]
■13:30-14:30 
報告者 水野景子(関西学院大学大学院)
          「社会的ジレンマ状況における罰の逆効果」       
対論者 竹内あい(立命館大学)

■14:40-15:40 
報告者 大角道子(長崎大学)
          「The Incentive Effect of Full and Garbled Reporting: Theory and Experiment (joint with Yukihiko Funaki, Edward Halim and Yohanes E. Riyanto)」      
対論者 神戸伸輔(学習院大学)

■15:50-16:50 
報告者 篠田太郎(早稲田大学大学院)
   「Linguistic Analysis of Three-person Unstructured Bargaining Experiment」   
対論者 上條良夫(早稲田大学)

■17:00-18:00 
Speaker Tomohito AOYAMA(Hitotsubashi University) 
     "Experimental Evaluation of Random Incentive System Under Ambiguity"  
Discussant Aurelien Baillon(Erasmus University Rotterdam)

[言語]
日本語、英語

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Global climate cooperation without sanctions

下記のオンラインセミナーを開催しました。

[日程] 2021年12月17日 (金)  16:30-18:00

[発表者]   岡田 章 (一橋大学名誉教授)

[題目]  Global climate cooperation without sanctions

[言語] 英語

[概要] 
The negative result on the level of cooperation in the literature of international environmental agreements is caused by the static nature of a two-stage participation game. We present a dynamic coalition formation game where coalitions are irreversible, and countries negotiate transfer schemes to attract non-participants. We show that if countries are sufficiently patient, then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium where the grand coalition forms immediately. We further show that if countries are impatient, the grand coalition gradually forms in finitely many rounds for every Markov perfect equilibrium under a super-additivity condition. The results hold for any transfer scheme satisfying individual rationality and coalitional efficiency.

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Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory 

[日程] 2021年10月20日(水)、21日(木)

[プログラム] ※ST: Spanish time、 JT: Japanese time
■Session1 10月20日(水)10:00-11:30 (ST), 17:00-18:30 (JT)
〈Chair : Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University)〉
●10:00-10:30 (ST)、17:00-17:30(JT) 
 表題 Comparative statics of Bargaining Solution: Equality and insensitivity biases by mis-specifying utility function
 発表者 Yoshio Kamijo (Waseda University)
●10:30-11:00 (ST)、 17:30-18:00 (JT) 
 表題 Social solidarity with dummies in TU games
 発表者 Ricardo Mart´ınez (Universidad de Granada)
●11:00-11:30 (ST)、 18:00-18:30 (JT)
 表題 Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Tie-Breaker-Augmented Object
Allocation Problem with Discrete Payments
 発表者 Ryosuke Sakai (Osaka University)

■Session 2 10月20日  12:00-13:30 (ST), 19:00-20:30 (JT).
〈Chair: Elena Molis (Universidad de Granada)〉
●12:00-12:30 (ST), 19:00-19:30 (JT) 
 表題 Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Unit Object Allocation with Money: (Non)decreasing Marginal Valuations without Quasi-Linearity
 発表者 Hiroki Shonozaki (Osaka University)
●12:30-13:00 (ST), 19:30-20:00 (JT) 
 表題 Dynamic housing market
 発表者 Pietro Salmaso (Universidad de Malaga) 
●13:00-13:30 (ST), 20:00-20:30 (JT) 
 表題 An Informational Theory of Alliances
 発表者 Raghul Venkatesh (Universidad de Malaga)

■Session 3. 10月21日, 10:00-11:30 (ST), 17:00-18:30 (JT).
Chair: Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda University)
●10:00-10:30 (ST), 17:00-17:30 (JT) 
 表題 (The impossibility of) Deliberation-Consistent Social Choice
 発表者 Tshuyosi Adachi (Waseda University)
●10:30-11:00 (ST), 17:30-18:00 (JT) 
 表題 Optimal management of evolving hierarchies
 発表者 Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Universidad Pablo de Olavide)
●11:00-11:30 (ST), 18:00-18:30 (JT) 
 表題 On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining
 発表者 Robert Veszteg (Waseda University)

■Session 4 10月21日 12:00-13:30 (ST), 19:00-20:30 (JT)
〈Chair: Bernardo Moreno (Universidad de Malaga) 〉
●12:00-12:30 (ST), 19:00-19:30 (JT) 
 表題 A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices
 発表者 Yuya Wakabayashi (Osaka University)
●12:30-13:00 (ST), 19:30-20:00 (JT) 
 表題 Is small always beautiful?
 発表者 Francisco Alvarez (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)
●13:00-13:30 (ST), 20:00-20:30 (JT) 
 表題 Uncovering Seeds
 発表者 Marc Vorsatz (UNED)

[スポンサー]
• JSPS Core-to-Core Program (JPJSCCA20200001)
• JSPS KAKENHI Grants (20H05631, 17H02503)
• Joint Usage/Research Center at ISER, Osaka University
• Osaka University’s International Joint Research Promotion Program (Type A)
• Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion (PID2020-114309GB-I00; PID2020-115011GB-I00)
• Junta de Andaluc´ıa 

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Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics 2021

日程 2021年8月31日(火) 9:30ー17:35
内容・詳細は 下記PDFファイル参照

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The Winner-Take-All Dilemma: Theory and Experiments

下記のZoomセミナーを開催しました。

日程[Date]  2021年5月28日 (金) [28 (Fri.) May.] 16:40-18:00

報告者[Speaker]   Yukio Koriyama (École polytechnique)

題目[Title]   The Winner-Take-All Dilemma: Theory and Experiments

言語[Language]   English

Abstract:
We consider a preference aggregation problem in which the society is partitioned into different groups and each group decides the internal rule by which the members’ preferences are aggregated. Kikuchi and Koriyama (2021) characterized the winner-take-all rule by strategic dominance while the Pareto set is fully given by the generalized proportional profiles, implying that the game is an n-player prisoner’s dilemma. However, Pareto dominance by the purely proportional profile is proven only asymptotically and there are counterexamples either for a small number of groups, with internal heterogeneity, or with costly voting. In this project, we provide welfare analysis by considering conditions under which the Pareto dominance is violated. Using our theoretical and experimental analysis, we provide insights on the condition under which the oft-claimed statements hold, such as “the winner-take-all protects small states” or “the winner-take-all protects minority.” 

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2 Days Game Theory workshop 2021

下記の予定で、ゲーム理論ワークショップを2日に分けて行います。 いずれもZOOMによるオンラインワークショップです。参加希望者は(1)は2月25日まで、(2)は3月3日までに次のリンクから登録をしてください。なお、(1)の言語は日本語、(2)の言語は英語です。

(1) 2021年2月26日(金) [26(Fri.) Feb.] 16:30-18:00

報告者[Speaker] 板東桂介(信州大学准教授) Keisuke Bando(Shinsyu University)題目[Title] Title: Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem (joint with Ryo Kawasaki)
概要[Abstract] We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the unique stable set with respect to a sequential domination relation that is defined by a sequence of weak domination relations that satisfy outsider independence. An equivalent way of stating this result is that the core satisfies the property commonly stated as the existence of a path to stability. These results add to the importance of the core in an assignment problem where agents' preferences may not be quasilinear.
言語[Language] Japanese

(2) 2021年3月5日(金) [5(Fri.) March] 17:00-18:00

報告者[Speaker] Zhengxing Zou(Beijing Jiaotong University)
題目[Title] Sharing the Surplus and Proportional Values.
概要[Abstract] We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between his stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value in this family.
言語[Language] English

2021年3月5日(金) [5(Fri.) March] 18:00-19:00

報告者[Speaker] Rene van den Brink(Amsterdam VU)
題目[Title] Valuation Monotonicity, Fairness and Stability in Assignment Problems (joint work with Marina Nunez and Francisco Robles)
概要[Abstract] In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched with the same seller. Using Owen’s derived consistency, the two optimal rules are characterized among all allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with a variable population, without explicitly requiring stability. Whereas these two monotonicity properties suggest an asymmetric treatment of the two sides of the market, valuation fairness axioms require a more balanced effect on the payoffs of buyers and sellers when the valuation of buyers for the objects owned by the sellers change. For assignment markets with a variable population, we introduce grand valuation fairness requiring that, if all valuations decrease in the same amount, as long as all optimal matchings still remain optimal, this leads to equal changes in the payoff of all agents. We show that the fair division rules are the only rules that satisfy this grand valuation fairness and a weak derived consistency property.
言語[Language] English

 19:00-19:30 Discussions

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The 4th Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory (Oct. 19,23, 2020)

Sponsors: Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, JSPS KAKENHI Grants, JSPS Core-to-Core Program CEFM 
Organizers: Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda Univesity), Ricardo Martinez (Universidad de Granada), Bernardo Moreno Jiménez (Universidad de Málaga), Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Univeridad Pablo de Olavide), Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University) 

Part I (October 19, 2020) 
Session 1. Chair: Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University) 
08.00-09.30 (Spanish time); 15.00-16.30 (Japanese time) 
1) Junichiro Ishida (Osaka University) “Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences” (co-authored with Chia-Hui Chen and Wing Suen) 
2) Noriaki Matsushima (Osaka University) “Data-Driven Mergers and Personalization” (co-authored with Zhijun Chen, Chongwoo Choe, and Jiajia Cong) 
3) Kohei Kawamura (Waseda Univesity) “Efficient Equilibrium in Common Interest Voting Games”
Session 2. Chair: Ricardo Martinez (Universidad de Granada) 
10.00-11.30 (Spanish time); 17.00-18.30 (Japanese time) 
4) Bernardo Moreno Jiménez (Universidad de Málaga) “Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices” 
5) Gustavo Bergantiños (Universidade de Vigo) “On the Axiomatic Approach to Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sports Leagues” 
6) Pablo Amorós (Universidad de Málaga) “Selecting Winners by Possibly Biased Committees” 

Part II (October 23, 2020) 
Session 3. Chair: Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda Univesity) 
08.00-09.30 (Spanish time); 15.00-16.30 (Japanese time) 
7) Yoshio Kamijo (Waseda University) “Group Size Paradox Revisited in Group Contest: Theory and Experiment” 
8) Patrick Dejarnette (Waseda University) “Failure of Bayesian Updating and the Echo Chamber Effect” (co-authored with Chun-Hou Cheng and Joseph Tao-yi Wang)
9) Ryosuke Sakai (Osaka University) “Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Tie-Breaker-Augmented Object Allocation Problem with Discrete Payments” (co-authored with Shigehiro Serizawa) 
Session 4. Chair: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Univeridad Pablo de Olavide) 
10.00-11.30 (Spanish time); 17.00-18.30 (Japanese time) 
10) Ricardo Martínez (Universidad de Granada) “A Generalized Domain for the Museum Pass Problem” 
11) Jorge Alcalde-Unzu (Universidad Pública de Navarra) “Strategy-Proofness in a Domain with Single-Peaked and Single-Dipped Preferences” 
12) Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Univeridad Pablo de Olavide) “Fair International Protocols for the Abatement of GHG Emissions”

*Please contact to CEFMproject@gmail.com if you like to participate this meeting.

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CEFM キックオフ・ワークショップ 2020年10月2日(金)14:45-18:00

14:45-15:30 Xin Fang (Waseda University) Beauty-contest effect in stock-price-prediction experiments
15:30-16:15  河又裕士 (筑波大学) キーワード・オークションで現れる動的均衡が検索エンジンの期待収益に与える影響について
<休憩>
16:30-17:30 Kenju Kamei (University of DurhamFree Riding and Workplace Democracy–Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting
17:30-18:00 フリーディスカッション

Zoomを利用して開催します。ご参加希望の方は CEFMproject@gmail.com までご連絡ください。

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CEFM 若手研究者ワークショップ 2020年9月7日(月)10:00-17:30

本プロジェクト後援の研究ワークショップがオンラインで9月7日(月)に開催されました。プログラムの詳細はこちらのリンク先をごらんください。

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CEFM 連続Zoomセミナー

本プロジェクトの関連分野のセミナーを連続して行います。原則的に来聴自由です。 

日程[Date] 2020年5月22日(金)
報告者[Speaker]上條良夫(早稲田大学)
題目[Title] Organization Design for Coordination and Cooperation: Model Analysis and Behavioral Experiment (joint with Daisuke Nakama)

日程[Date] 2020年6月19日(金)
報告者[Speaker]Frank Huettner (Graduate School of Business, SKK University)
題目[Title] Potential and Sobolev Consistency of the Average Shapley Value (joint with Andre Casajus and Yukihiko Funaki)

日程[Date] 2020年7月10日(金)
報告者[Speaker]Takaaki Abe (Waseda University)
題目[Title] Buck-passing Dumping in a Pure Exchange Game of Bads"

日程[Date] 2020年7月31日(金)
報告者[Speaker]   Satoshi Nakada (School of Management, Department of Business Economics, Tokyo University of Science.)
題目[Title]    Stable Coalition Structures of Patent Licensing Games

日程[Date]  2020年11月20日(金)
報告者[Speaker] 篠 潤之介 (早稲田大学)
題目[Title] Shapley mapping and its axiomatization in n-person cooperative interval games

日程[Date]  2020年1月29日(金)
報告者[Speaker] Ryohei Shimoda (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University)
題目[Title] Majority games with minority protection for public project economies: core and super-additivity



セミナーのご参加については CEFMproject@gmail.com までお問い合わせください。

※上記の全てのセミナーは日本学術振興会 研究拠点形成事業に後援されています。


連絡先:CEFMproject@gmail.com