【開催予定のセミナー】
船木部会より、ワークショップをご案内いたします。
皆様のご参加をお待ち申し上げます。
We are pleased to announce a workshop.
We look forward to your participation.
日程[Date]：2024年11月22日（金）[22(Fri.) November, 2024] 17:00-18:30
開催場所[Place]：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス3号館909号室 [Room 909 of Building 3 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
言語[Language]：英語 (English)
報告者[Speaker]：Marc Willinger (University of Montpellier)
題目[Title]："Efficiency of the Minimum Approval Mechanism with heterogeneous players"
概要[Abstract]：We explore, theoretically and experimentally, how endowment inequalities affect the effectiveness of the Minimal Approval Mechanism (MAM) at improving the level of provision of a public good. We find that the mechanism is still Pareto-improving under endowment heterogeneity, but that its efficiency diminishes as inequality is increased. Our experimental findings indicate a significant weakening of the mechanism under endowment inequalities, surpassing our theoretical predictions. A close examination of individual behaviors reveals a significant drop in contributions compared to the uniform case, prompted by even minor inequalities. Intriguingly, our findings challenge conventional assumptions by showing that inequality aversion drives contributions in a public good game with endowment disparities only under certain assumptions. We explore the impact of beliefs about the contributions of advantaged player as potential motivations through guilt aversion and Kantian preferences.
【開催終了したセミナー】
日程[Date] ：2024年10月18日（金）[18(Fri.) October, 2024] 13:30-14:45
開催場所[Place]：７号館 ３１０号室 [Room 310 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
報告者[Speaker]：John Duffy (University of California)
講演タイトル[Title]："Selection Pressure in Repeated Contests"
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
日程[Date] ：2024年6月28日（金）[28(Fri.) June, 2024] 17:00-18:30
開催場所[Place]：7号館201号室 [Room 201 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
報告者[Speaker]：Jean-Robert Tyran (Professor of Economics, University of Vienna)
講演タイトル[Title]：Why votes are (not) for sale - Empirical evidence from Southern India
概要[Abstract]：India is the world’s largest democracy. One of the reasons why it is considered a “flawed” democracy is that elections are often manipulated by political candidates paying “cash for votes” (C4V). My talk provides a progress report on a project to identify determinants and motives for why voters do (or do not) sell their votes. We use a large-scale survey with registered voters and with politicians in a rural border region of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to test for potential determinants of C4V. We also explore the causal effects of informational interventions (RCTs) to mitigate CFV which relate to strengthening civicness among voters and improving transparency about politician characteristics.
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
No advance registration is required. Please come directly to the Place.
日程[Date] ：2023年2月2日（金）[2(Fri.) Feb., 2024] 17:00-18:30
開催場所[Place]：7号館209号室 [Room 209 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
報告者[Speaker]：草川孝夫[Takao kusakawa] (高知工科大学[Kochi University of Technology])
講演タイトル[Title]： Informed Traders, Beauty Contest, and Stock Price Volatility:Evidence from Laboratory Markets
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
No advance registration is required. Please come directly to the Place.
日程[Date] ：2023年11月17日（金）[17(Fri.) Octorber, 2023] 17:00-18:30
開催場所[Place]：7号館209号室 [Room 209 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
報告者[Speaker]：Ali Ozkes (SKEMA Business School)
講演タイトル[Title]： Reproducibility in Management Science”
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
概要[Abstract] ：With the help of more than 700 reviewers we assess the reproducibility of nearly 500 articles published in the journal Management Science before and after the introduction of a new Data and Code Disclosure policy in 2019. When considering only articles for which data accessibility and hard- and software requirements were not an obstacle for reviewers, the results of more than 95% of articles under the new disclosure policy could be fully or largely computationally reproduced. However, for almost 29% of articles at least part of the dataset was not accessible for the reviewer. Considering all articles in our sample reduces the share of reproduced articles to 68%. The introduction of the disclosure policy increased reproducibility significantly, since only 12% of articles accepted before the introduction of the disclosure policy voluntarily provided replication materials, out of which 55% could be (largely) reproduced. Substantial heterogeneity in reproducibility rates across different fields is mainly driven by differences in dataset accessibility. Other reasons for unsuccessful reproduction attempts include missing code, unresolvable code errors, weak or missing documentation, but also soft- and hardware requirements and code complexity. Our findings highlight the importance of journal code and data disclosure policies, and suggest potential avenues for enhancing their effectiveness.
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
No advance registration is required. Please come directly to the Place.
日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFMワークショップ
Waseda Workshop on Game Theory 日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業共催
日程[Date&Time] ：2023年9月4日（月）[4(Mon.) September, 2023] 15:00-18:00
開催場所[Place]：7号館209号室 [Room 209 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
プログラム[Program]
(1) 15:00-16:30
報告者[Speaker] Youngsube Chun (Seoul National University, Emeritus Professor)
報告タイトル[Title] T.B.A.
言語[Language] English
(2) 16:50-18:00
報告者[Speaker] Yuan Ju (University of York),
報告タイトル[Title] The English Housing Market Mechanism joint work with Zaifu Yang (U York), and Jingsheng Yu (Wuhan U)
概要[Abstract] This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
言語[Language] English
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
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日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFMワークショップ
日程[Date&Time] ：2023年8月3日（木）[3(Thu.) August, 2023] 17:00-18:30
開催場所[Place]：7号館209号室 [Room 209 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
報告者[Speaker]：Bruno Strulovici（Northwestern University)
講演タイトル[Title]： A concept of far-sighted sets based on revision games
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
概要[Abstract] ：TBA
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
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Summer Workshop on Economic Theory（SWET2023）
“Risk-return trade-offs in the context of environmental impact: an experiment with finance professionals and students”
(with Sébastien Duchêne, Adrien Nguyen Huu and Dimitri Dubois)
日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFMワークショップ
開催場所：早稲田大学7号館209号室
使用言語：英語
プログラム
(1)
報告者：Elena molis(University of Granada)
講演タイトル：“To acquit or convict: A social matter?
(2)
報告者：Maria Gomez Rua (University of Vigo)
講演タイトル： "Stable and Weakly Additive Cost Sharing in Shortest Path Problems", with Juan Vidal Puga (University of Vigo) and Eric Bahel (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University).
概要[Abstract] ：In a shortest path problem, agents seek to ship their respective demands; and the cost on a given arc is linear in the flow. Rosenthal (2013) and Bahel and Trudeau (2014) have proposed cost allocations falling in the core of the associated cooperative game. The present work combines core selection with weak versions of the additivity axiom, which allows to characterize a new family of rules. The demander rule charges to each demander the cost of their shortest path; and the supplier rule charges the cost of the second-cheapest path while splitting the excess payment equally between access suppliers. Moreover, with three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity and two additional axioms that ensure the fair compensation of intermediaries. With three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity and two additional fairnesss properties.
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFMワークショップ
日程 ：2023年6月16日（金） 17:00-18:30
開催場所：7号館209号室
報告者：Charles Noussair（The University of Arizona)
講演タイトル： Higher order risk preferences and economic decisions
使用言語：英語
概要 ：TBA
申込方法：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFMワークショップ
日程 ：2023年6月15日（金）17:00-18:30
開催場所：3号館1103号室
報告者：Marco Dall'Aglio ( LUISS University, Italy )
講演タイトル： A Comparison of Group Criticality Notions for Simple Games
使用言語：英語
概要 ：TBA
申込方法：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
日程[Date&Time] ：2023年5月26日（金）[12(Fri.) May, 2023] 15:15-16:45
開催場所[Place]：3号館305号室 [Room 305 of Building 3 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
報告者[Speaker]：Haimanti Bhattacharya（University of Utha)
講演タイトル[Title]： Bargaining in a marketplace with contractual breach: Evidence from field experiments(Authors Subhasish Dugar & Haimanti Bhattacharya)
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
概要[Abstract] ：
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
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日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFMワークショップ
【日時】2023年５月 12日 15：15－16：45
【場所】早稲田大学 早稲田キャンパス３号館305教室
【報告者】Alberto Prati (UCL, University of Oxford, LSE)
【講演タイトル】A causal identification of wishful beliefs about COVID-19 vaccines
【概要】This study exploits a natural experiment which occurred in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. UK residents could choose to opt into the vaccination program, but not which vaccine they received. We surveyed a sample of UK residents about their beliefs on the different COVID-19 vaccines before and after receiving their jab. We show that random assignment to a vaccine predicts a divergence of opinions about its safety and effectiveness. Before vaccination, individuals exhibit similar prior beliefs and wishes about the different vaccines. After vaccination, however, they update their beliefs optimistically about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine they received, and state greater preference for the vaccine they actually received. At the individual level, our results provide a causal identification of wishful beliefs in a real-world health setting. At the aggregated level, our data show that belief divergence can occur even when similar people hold similar priors, are exposed to similar information environments, and have no room for the ex-post rationalization of previous decisions.
【申し込み】事前の申し込みは不要です。直接会場までお越しください。
日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFM長崎大学ワークショップ
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PJIR continuous workshop
JSPS国際共同研究加速基金主催 日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFM共催
Sponsored by Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research
【場所】早稲田大学３号館 3-801
【日時】１月２５、２６、２７日
【申し込み】事前申し込みは不要です。会場まで直接起こしください。
【プログラム】
１月２５日
16:30 Ricardo Martinez (Universidad de Granada), “Redistribution with Needs, “
17:30 Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Universidad Pablo de Olavide),
“The Costs and Benefits of Multilingualism,”
１月２６日
16:30 Ryuichiro Ishikawa (Waseda University),
“A Resolution of the Centipede Paradox: Cognitive Bounds, Inertial Behavior, and Counter Factuality,”
17:30 Junnosuke Shino (Waseda University),
“Bank of Japan's ETF Purchase Program, Share Lending Market and Stock Returns,”
１月２７日
16:30 Yaron Lahav (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev),
“Emotions and Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets,”
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日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業CEFMワークショップ
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日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 WINPEC workshop for Game theory and Experiments
CEFM、国際共同研究加速基金 共催
日程[Date]:2023年１月６日 1２：４５‐１８：３０
開催場所[Place]：早稲田大学 早稲田キャンパス ３号館704号室
申込[Application]:参加ご希望の方は、 funaki@waseda.jp までご連絡ください。
プログラム[Program]：
【Session 1】
12:45 Opening
12:50 Xiaohui Wang (Doctoral student, Waseda University) “not yet fixed”
13:00 Jingru Wang (Master student, Waseda University)
“Experimental analysis of IPO pricing mechanism: The case of Book-building”
13:20 Hideaki Minami (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“Experimental Analysis of Hedonic Games”
13:40 Daeseok Kim (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“Equilibrium analysis of the two-stage electoral competition model”
14:00 Hyoji Kwon (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“Fairness Ideal VS. Gender: The Effect of Empathy”
14:20 Ayano Nakagawa (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“On Multikeyword Sponsored Search Auctions: Equilibria, Revenue and Welfare”
14:40 Xin Fang (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“Learing and beauty-contest effect in stock trading experiments-designs and results”
15:00 break
【Session 2】
15:15 Mashbat Suzuki (University of New South Wales)
“Introduction to discrete fair division”
15:45 Liping Tang (Waseda University)
“Language politeness in social network”
16:15 break
【Session 3】
16:30 Yuki Takahashi (European University Institute)
“Gender Differences in the Cost of Corrections in Group Work”
17:30 David Lowing (Kyushu University)
“Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach”
18:30 closing
日本学術振興会研究拠点形成事業 CEFMセミナー
日程[Date] ：2022年12月9日（金）[9(Fri.) December, 2022] 16：30－18：00
開催場所[Place]： 3号館704号室 [Room 704 of Building 3 (Waseda campus)]
報告者[Speaker]：Jonathan Yeo Xiong Wei（Nanyang Technological University Singapore）
講演タイトル[Title]： Ingroup Bias with Multiple Identities: The Case of Attitudes towards Religion and Government
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
概要[Abstract] ：Group identity is known to exert a powerful socio-psychological influence on behaviour but to date has been largely explored as a uni-dimensional phenomenon. In an experiment, we consider the role of creating broader attention to multiple orthogonal dimensions of identity, asking whether it may help alleviate ingroup biases. We first induce identity categories in participants in either one or two politically charged identity dimensions documented to be of similar strength and largely orthogonal (religious belief and views about government size). Subsequently, we measure ingroup bias on each separate dimension (without revealing the other dimension) by using third party allocation tasks. We find that creating broader attention to another dimension of identity has a noticeable effect on behaviour in the revealed dimension --- albeit not in the direction expected. Broader attention can generate a significant increase in ingroup allocations at the expense of fairness to outgroup individuals, although the effect varies depending on whether religion or government size is the dimension which is revealed. Evidence suggests that the heterogeneity of such effects is related to the degree of ``harmony'' between groups in the dimensions concerned.
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
日程[Date] ：2022年12月9日（金）[9(Fri.) December, 2022] 16：30－18：00
講演タイトル[Title]： Ingroup Bias with Multiple Identities: The Case of Attitudes towards Religion and Government
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6th SPAIN-JAPAN MEETING ON ECONOMIC THEORY
［日時］2022年10月24日（月）、25日（火）
［場所］オンライン（zoom)
［登録および詳細］
10月19日までに下記URLよりご登録ください。(大阪大学社会経済研究所Ｗｅｂページ）
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/collabo/event_20221024_1025.html
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International Workshop on Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance
[日時] 2022年10月８日 9:30-17:00
[場所] 大阪大学社会経済研究所
[登録および詳細](大阪大学社会経済研究所Ｗｅｂページ）
下記URL内の登録ページより10月４日までにご登録ください。
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/collabo/event_20221008.html
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Special Lecture on Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance by John Duffy
日時 2022年9月30日、10月7日 16：30－18:00
場所 オンライン（zoom）
講師 John Duffy(University of California Irvine)
テーマ Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance
登録および詳細(大阪大学社会経済研究所Ｗｅｂページ）https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/collabo/event_20220930.html
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Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics
[日程] ９月11日（日）、12日（月） 10：00－17：00
[場所] 慶応義塾大学三田キャンパス（東京都港区三田2－15－45）およびオンライン
[プログラム]
The Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics 2022 program
CEFMセミナー
日程[Date] 8月5日 (金) [5 (Fri.) Aug.] 16：30－18：00
場所[Place] 早稲田大学３号館９階９０９教室 [Waseda Iniversity Building 3 9th floor Room909]
報告者[Speaker] Di Feng (University of Lausanne)
題目[Title] "Top trading cycles based mechanisms for multiple-type housing markets"
言語[Language] 英語 [English]
概要[Abstract] 1) Characterizing the Coordinatewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets, with Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn
We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model of trading indivisible objects (houses) (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the coordinatewise top-trading-cycles (cTTC) mechanism.
We first show that on the subdomain of lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy-proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the cTTC mechanism (Theorem 1). Second, using Theorem 1, we obtain a corresponding characterization on the domain of separable preferences (Theorem 2). We obtain corresponding results when replacing [strategy-proofness and non-bossiness] with effective group (or pairwise) strategy-proofness (Corollaries 1 and 2). Finally, we show that on the domain of strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness (Theorem 3). Our characterizations of the cTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets.
2) Endowments-swapping-proofness in Multiple-Type Housing Markets
For Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), Fujinaka and Wakayama (2018) propose a new incentive property, endowments-swapping-proofness, that excludes manipulations that a pair of agents can conduct before the operation of the selected mechanism by swapping their endowments. We investigate endowments-swapping-proofness for Moulin (1995)’s multiple-type housing markets, which are an extension of Shapley-Scarf housing markets with multi-unit demand. Different to Shapley-Scarf housing markets, for multiple-type housing markets, there are various ways to swap endowments. Motivated by this observation, we introduce three extensions of endowments-swapping-proofness: bundle endowments-swapping-proofness, one type endowments-swapping-proofness, and flexible endowments-swapping-proofness.
Based on the first two weaker endowments-swapping-proofness properties that we proposed, and other well-studied properties (individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness), on several preferences domains we provide characterizations of two extensions of the top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism: the Bundle top-trading-cycles (bTTC) mechanism and the coordinate-wise top-trading-cycles (cTTC) mechanism. Moreover, we also show that the strongest possible endowments-swapping-proofness property (flexible endowments-swapping-proofness) leads to an impossibility.
Our characterization of the bTTC mechanism constitutes the first characterization of an extension of the prominent TTC mechanism to multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences.
本セミナーはどなたでも来聴自由です。事前予約は不要です。日程などをご確認の上、直接会場にお越しください。
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CEFMセミナー
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CEFMセミナー
日時[Date]：2022年７月15日（金） 16：30－18：30
開催場所[Place]：早稲田大学 早稲田キャンパス ３号館704教室
使用言語[Language]：英語
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
【第一部】[Session1]報告者[Speaker]：Wael Bousselmi（Ecole polytechnique）
講演タイトル[Title]： "How do markets react to (un)expected fundamental value shocks? An experimental analysis"
概要[Abstract]：We study experimentally the reaction of asset markets to fundamental value (FV) shocks. The pre-shock and post-shock FV are both constant, but after the shock the FV is either higher or lower than before. We compare treatments with expected shocks (the date and the magnitude are known in advance, but not the direction) to treatments with unexpected shocks (subjects only know that a shock may occur but are unaware of the date and the magnitude). We observe mispricing in markets without shocks and in markets with shocks. Shocks tend to reduce the post-shock price deviation and to increase the difference of opinions (DO), whatever the type of the shock (expected or unexpected) and its direction (upwards or downwards). In contrast to standard predictions, the larger DO after a shock is not accompanied by an increase in transaction volumes, but by sharp depression of share turnover.
【第二部】[Session2]報告者[Speaker]：Ali Ozkes（EMLV business school)
講演タイトル[Title]："Polarization in Networks: Identification-alienation Framework" (joint work with Kenan Huremovic (IMT Lucca, Italy))
概要[Abstract]：We introduce a model of polarization in networks as a unifying setting for the measurement of polarization that covers a wide range of applications. We consider a substantially general setup for this purpose: node- and edge-weighted, undirected, and connected networks. We generalize the axiomatic characterization of Esteban and Ray (1994) and show that only a particular instance within this class can be used justifiably to measure polarization in networks.
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CEFMワークショップ
日程[Date] ：2022年７月８日（金） 16：30－18：00
開催場所[Place]：早稲田大学 早稲田キャンパス 3号館704号室
報告者[Speaker]：Matias Nunez(Ecole polytechnique）
講演タイトル[Title]： "Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation"
使用言語[Language]：英語
概要[Abstract] ：Eliminating –or trimming– extreme reports before aggregating them is usually motivated by the perception that it constitutes a remedy for strategic misreporting. This work focuses on the strategic calculus of voting when using trimmed-mean mechanisms for preference aggregation. Contrary to the above presumption, we show, both formally and experimentally that, under such mechanisms, voters persistently resort to strategic polarization for all but the most extreme levels of trimming. Furthermore, we show that while trimming promotes efficiency (i.e. the average payoff increases), it also leads to more inequality (i.e. the minimum payoff decreases). While experimental results provide some support for the idea that trimming can mitigate strategic misreporting, the extent of this non-equilibrium behavior is not enough to overturn the comparative static predictions in this setting.
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CEFMセミナー
日程[Date] 7月1日 (金) [1 (Fri.) July] 16：30－18：00場所[Place] 早稲田大学3号館704教室 [Waseda University, 3-704]報告者[Speaker] Alina Velias（the London School of Economics）題目[Title] The ignorance trap: who falls prey to expert-defying populism and why 言語[Language] 英語 [English]概要[Abstract] How do people choose expert advice? What personal traits determine the persuasiveness of expert versus populist advice? Populists, in our context, conform to commonly held beliefs, even when wrong. Do participants choose the high-accuracy adviser (‘the Expert’), or the low accuracy one (‘the Charlatan’), whose answers are designed to be similar to the modal participant’s? In this paper, building on previous work by Alysandratos, Boukouras, Georganas & Maniadis (2021), we develop and test on a representative sample of 12000 subjects, a simple task that captures the essence of the expertise detection problem, yet has a very tractable theoretical solution: if you (believe you) are knowledgeable in a topic, choose experts you agree with. If you are not knowledgeable, you are better served by experts that tell you what you did not think of yourself.
We find that high human capital subjects find it easier to apply the counterintuitive strategy than others. Simply put, to be able to persuade the median citizen and those lying lower in the cognitive distribution, experts face a double challenge: they have to lower the citizens’ disbelief regarding the expert’s advice and convince them that any lingering disbelief might be a good sign. Our findings provide a novel explanation why low-skilled citizens are susceptible to populism. It is not about preferences, incentives, or simple motivated reasoning. Some citizens simply cannot distinguish populist charlatans from true experts. While we have identified a mechanism that allows charlatans to win, and the target audience for this sort of populism, finding comprehensive solutions to overcome it is left for further research. ーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーー
参加研究者セミナー
日程[Date] 6月24日 (金) [24 (Fri.) June.] 16：30－18：00場所[Place] 早稲田大学3号館704教室 (Waseda University, 3-704)報告者[Speaker] Charles Noussair（The University of Arizona） アメリカ側コーディネーター題目[Title] Don’t tell anyone I lost to a girl! Gender stereotypes and hiding low performance言語[Language] 英語 (English)概要[Abstract] Social scientists from several disciplines have asserted that men incur a psychological cost when they are outperformed by a female competitor. We conduct a laboratory experiment that allows us to measure this cost for performance in a mathematical task. The experiment is conducted in both the US and China.We find that in our Chinese sample, men are willing to pay more to hide the fact that they have performed worse than another individual than women are, while there is no gender difference in the US. In China, women are willing to pay more to hide poor performance when losing to another woman than to a man. In the US, the opposite pattern is observed; women have a greater cost of revealing that they have lost to a man than to another woman. The gender of the counterpart is not a determinant of men’s willingness to hide poor performance. An incentivized questionnaire reveals that a stereotype that men would outperform women exists in the Chinese sample, but not among our American participants.
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参加研究者セミナー
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CEFMオンラインワークショップ
Global climate cooperation without sanctions
下記のオンラインセミナーを開催しました。
[日程] 2021年12月17日 (金) 16：30－18：00
[発表者] 岡田 章 （一橋大学名誉教授）
[題目] Global climate cooperation without sanctions
[言語] 英語
[概要] The negative result on the level of cooperation in the literature of international environmental agreements is caused by the static nature of a two-stage participation game. We present a dynamic coalition formation game where coalitions are irreversible, and countries negotiate transfer schemes to attract non-participants. We show that if countries are sufficiently patient, then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium where the grand coalition forms immediately. We further show that if countries are impatient, the grand coalition gradually forms in finitely many rounds for every Markov perfect equilibrium under a super-additivity condition. The results hold for any transfer scheme satisfying individual rationality and coalitional efficiency.
Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics 2021
The Winner-Take-All Dilemma: Theory and Experiments
We consider a preference aggregation problem in which the society is partitioned into different groups and each group decides the internal rule by which the members’ preferences are aggregated. Kikuchi and Koriyama (2021) characterized the winner-take-all rule by strategic dominance while the Pareto set is fully given by the generalized proportional profiles, implying that the game is an n-player prisoner’s dilemma. However, Pareto dominance by the purely proportional profile is proven only asymptotically and there are counterexamples either for a small number of groups, with internal heterogeneity, or with costly voting. In this project, we provide welfare analysis by considering conditions under which the Pareto dominance is violated. Using our theoretical and experimental analysis, we provide insights on the condition under which the oft-claimed statements hold, such as “the winner-take-all protects small states” or “the winner-take-all protects minority.”
2 Days Game Theory workshop 2021
(1) 2021年2月26日(金) [26(Fri.) Feb.] 16：30－18：00
報告者[Speaker] 板東桂介（信州大学准教授） Keisuke Bando（Shinsyu University)題目[Title] Title: Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem (joint with Ryo Kawasaki)
概要[Abstract] We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the unique stable set with respect to a sequential domination relation that is defined by a sequence of weak domination relations that satisfy outsider independence. An equivalent way of stating this result is that the core satisfies the property commonly stated as the existence of a path to stability. These results add to the importance of the core in an assignment problem where agents' preferences may not be quasilinear.
言語[Language] Japanese
(2) 2021年3月5日(金) [5(Fri.) March] 17：00－18：00
報告者[Speaker] Zhengxing Zou（Beijing Jiaotong University)
題目[Title] Sharing the Surplus and Proportional Values.
概要[Abstract] We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between his stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value in this family.
言語[Language] English
2021年3月5日(金) [5(Fri.) March] 18：00－19：00
報告者[Speaker] Rene van den Brink(Amsterdam VU）
題目[Title] Valuation Monotonicity, Fairness and Stability in Assignment Problems (joint work with Marina Nunez and Francisco Robles)
概要[Abstract] In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched with the same seller. Using Owen’s derived consistency, the two optimal rules are characterized among all allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with a variable population, without explicitly requiring stability. Whereas these two monotonicity properties suggest an asymmetric treatment of the two sides of the market, valuation fairness axioms require a more balanced effect on the payoffs of buyers and sellers when the valuation of buyers for the objects owned by the sellers change. For assignment markets with a variable population, we introduce grand valuation fairness requiring that, if all valuations decrease in the same amount, as long as all optimal matchings still remain optimal, this leads to equal changes in the payoff of all agents. We show that the fair division rules are the only rules that satisfy this grand valuation fairness and a weak derived consistency property.
言語[Language] English
19:00-19:30 Discussions
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The 4th Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory (Oct. 19,23, 2020)
Sponsors: Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, JSPS KAKENHI Grants, JSPS Core-to-Core Program CEFMOrganizers: Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda Univesity), Ricardo Martinez (Universidad de Granada), Bernardo Moreno Jiménez (Universidad de Málaga), Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Univeridad Pablo de Olavide), Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University)
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CEFM キックオフ・ワークショップ 2020年10月2日(金)14：45－18：00
CEFM 若手研究者ワークショップ 2020年9月7日(月）10：00－17：30
CEFM 連続Zoomセミナー
本プロジェクトの関連分野のセミナーを連続して行います。原則的に来聴自由です。日程[Date] 2020年5月22日（金）
報告者[Speaker]上條良夫（早稲田大学）
題目[Title] Organization Design for Coordination and Cooperation: Model Analysis and Behavioral Experiment (joint with Daisuke Nakama)
日程[Date] 2020年6月19日（金）
報告者[Speaker]Frank Huettner (Graduate School of Business, SKK University)
題目[Title] Potential and Sobolev Consistency of the Average Shapley Value (joint with Andre Casajus and Yukihiko Funaki)
日程[Date] 2020年7月10日（金）
報告者[Speaker]Takaaki Abe (Waseda University)
題目[Title] Buck-passing Dumping in a Pure Exchange Game of Bads"
日程[Date] 2020年7月31日（金）
報告者[Speaker] Satoshi Nakada (School of Management, Department of Business Economics, Tokyo University of Science.)
題目[Title] Stable Coalition Structures of Patent Licensing Games
セミナーのご参加については CEFMproject@gmail.com までお問い合わせください。
連絡先:CEFMproject@gmail.com
